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1. TURNING DREAMS INTO REALITY 
In 1944, Erwin Schrödinger [5] pondered the nature of life. 
[L]iving matter, while not eluding the ‘laws of physics’ … is 
likely to involve ‘other laws,’ [which] will form just as 
integral a part of [its] science. 
But if biology is not just physics what else is there? Schrödinger’s 
question is a special case of the more general question: can there 
be independent higher level laws of nature if everything is 
reducible to the fundamental laws of physics? The computer 
science notion of level of abstraction explains why there can—
illustrating how computational thinking can resolve one of 
philosophy’s most vexing problems. (Section 3 explains the 
essence of the solution.) This paper explores why the solution 
came from computer science rather than from engineering.  
Scientists analyze what exists. Those of us in computer science 
and engineering build new things. A poetic—if overused—way to 
put this is to say that we turn our dreams into reality. We 
transform ideas—which exist only as subjective experience—into 
phenomena of the material world.  
  
In raising the issue of the relationship between mind and the 
physical world I am not claiming to explain consciousness. But I 
am taking mind as a given and claiming that the relationship 
between ideas and physical reality is at the heart of the difference 
between engineering and computer science. Both disciplines 
begin with ideas. Computer science turns ideas into a symbolic 
reality; engineering turns ideas into a material reality. Although 
perhaps unremarkably true, the consequences are far-reaching.  
2. ENGINERING & COMPUTER SCIENCE 
Intellectual leverage: levels of abstraction vs. mathematical 
modeling and functional decomposition. Computer science gains 
intellectual leverage by building levels of abstraction, the 
implementation of new types and operations in terms of existing 
types and operations. A level of abstraction is always 
operationally reducible to an underlying domain, but it is 
characterized independently—what Searle calls causal but not 
ontological reducibility.1 Levels of abstraction allow computer 
scientists to create (symbolic but real) worlds that obey laws that 
are independent of their underlying platforms.  
Engineering gains intellectual leverage through mathematical 
modeling and functional decomposition. Both are taken only to 
approximate an underlying reality. Neither yields ontologically 
independent entities. The National Academy of Engineering 
points [3] out that “engineering systems often fail … because of 
[unanticipated low-level interactions (such as acoustic resonance) 
among well designed components] that could not be identified in 
isolation from the operation of the full systems.”  
Symbolic floor vs. no floor. By harnessing electrical signals as 
bits engineering enabled computer science. Bits are both real 
(material) and symbolic (no error bars). Computer science builds 
levels of abstraction on a base of bits—and relies on engineering 
when faced with issues beyond the bit—such as performance.  
But bits prevent computer science from working with the full 
richness of reality. Every software model has a fixed bottom 
level—making it impossible to explore phenomena that require 
dynamically varying lower levels. A good example is a biological 
arms race. Imagine a plant growing bark to protect itself from an 
insect. The insect may then develop a way to bore through bark. 
The plant may develop a toxin—for which the insect develops an 
anti-toxin. There are no software models in which evolutionary 
creativity of this sort occurs. The problem is that this sort of 
creativity is built upon varying levels of physics and biochemistry. 
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  In Mind [4] Searle claims that this nicely drawn distinction 
explains subjective experience. He doesn’t say how. 
Unless all of biochemistry is built in from the start—i.e., unless 
the model’s bottom level is the lowest level with any possible 
relevance, which is far beyond our computational means—we 
cannot build models with this degree of complexity and creativity. 
Engineering (like science) does not have this problem. It is both 
cursed and blessed by its attachment to physicality. It is cursed 
because one can never be sure of the ground on which one stands 
—raw nature does not provide a stable base. It is blessed because 
one can dig as deeply as needed for any particular problem. 
Thought externalization: software vs. design documents and 
material objects. The goal of both the computer scientist and the 
engineer is to turn ideas into phenomena in the world. (The goal 
of the scientist is to turn physical phenomena into ideas.) The first 
step is to externalize thought. By thought externalization I mean 
not just to act on a thought but to represent the thought outside 
the realm of subjective experience in a form that allows it to be 
examined and explored. Computer science and engineering 
externalize thought in different ways.  
An enduring goal [2] of computer science is to develop languages 
that have two important properties. (a) The language may be used 
to externalize thought. (b) Expressions in the language can act in 
the material world—that is, the language is executable. This is 
remarkably different from anything that has come before. Human 
beings have always used language to externalize thought. But to 
have an effect in the world, written expression has always 
depended on human beings. Words on paper mean nothing unless 
someone reads them; software acts without human intervention.  
Engineers externalize thought either by creating designs or by 
building objects. Designs—even computer-based designs—have 
the same limitation as other traditional languages. They require a 
person to understand them. The engineer who builds an object has 
indeed turned thought into a material phenomenon. But the 
thought is gone; all that’s left is the physical realization. To 
recover the thought requires reverse engineering. In computer 
science externalized thought is executable; in engineering it isn’t. 
3. THE REDUCTIONIST BLIND SPOT 
Here’s how levels of abstraction resolve the question posed at the 
beginning. (See [1] and [2].) In the Game of Life, the rules are 
analogous to the fundamental laws of physics: they determine 
everything that happens on a Game of Life grid. Nevertheless 
there can be higher level laws that are not derivable from them.  
Certain Game of Life configurations produce patterns. One can 
implement arbitrary Turing machines by arranging Game of Life 
patterns. Computability theory applies to these Turing machines. 
Thus while not eluding the Game of Life rules, new laws (i.e., 
computability theory) that are independent of the Game of Life 
rules apply at the Turing machine level—just as Schrödinger said.  
Furthermore, conclusions about Turing machines apply to Game 
of Life grid cells. Because the halting problem is undecidable, it is 
undecidable whether an arbitrary Game of Life configuration will 
reach a stable state. So, not only are there independent higher 
level laws, those laws have implications for the fundamental 
elements of the Game of Life. I call this downward entailment, a 
scientifically acceptable alternative to downward causation.  
Like all levels of abstraction, Game of Life patterns are 
epiphenomenal—they have no causal power. It is the elementary 
Game of Life rules that turn the causal crank. Why not reduce 
away these epiphenomena? Reducing away a level of abstraction 
results in a reductionist blind spot. No set of equations over the 
domain of Game of Life grid cells can describe the computations 
performed by a Game of Life Turing machine—unless the 
equations themselves model a Turing machine. The laws that 
characterize regularities at higher levels of abstraction are 
impossible to express when the abstractions are reduced away.  
This perspective applies beyond computer models. Nature—a 
“blind programmer”—builds levels of abstraction, a phenomenon 
sometimes referred to as emergence. This may be encapsulated as 
the principle of emergence: extant levels of abstraction—naturally 
occurring or man-made, static (at equilibrium) or dynamic (far 
from equilibrium)—are those whose implementations have 
materialized and whose environments support their persistence. 
4. SUMMARY 
Engineering has no stable base. Engineers must always be 
concerned about the possibility of lower level physical effects—
such as O-rings not functioning as sealants if the temperature is 
too low.2 Consequently, engineering has not been in an 
intellectual position to develop the notion of level-of-abstraction. 
But with its gift of the bit to computer science, engineering 
created a world that is both real and symbolic. Computer science 
developed the level-of-abstraction as a way to gain intellectual 
leverage over that world—and then applied that concept to solve a 
long-standing problem in the philosophy of science. 
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  Every implementation of a level of abstraction has feasibility 
conditions. Understanding safety margins as means to ensure 
that feasibility conditions are met would encourage engineering 
to operate in terms of levels of abstraction. Engineering designs 
often have safety factors where software has assertions. 
